Vol 7 2003 sentations as to the significance of the deed. On the basis that the policy arguments which persuaded the court in O'Brien were equally applicable in Scotland, a similar result was achieved in the House of Lords in Smith. Despite seeking to achieve the same end, each jurisdiction followed a different route. In England, the decision was based on the doctrine of "constructive notice", which deems, in certain circumstances, the creditor to know of the wrong committed by the debtor against the surety and to have been a participant in it. In the Scots case, the House of Lords drew upon the doctrine of good faith to impose on the creditor certain duties towards the cautioner.
This area conveniently breaks down into three broad elements, each of which will be considered in turn: (i) the actings of the debtor in relation to the cautioner; (ii) the facts which trigger the creditor's extra obligation towards the cautioner; and (iii) the content of the obligation on the creditor. It is clear that the duty on the lender is not to ensure that the cautioner actually understands, but to take reasonable steps to ensure that she understands. In the aftermath of O'Brien and Smith the practice of the banks was to advise potential guarantors to take legal advice rather than giving advice themselves, and much of the subsequent case-law has been concerned with the extent that the receipt of independent legal advice by the cautioner lets a lender off the hook.
As long as the lender has reasonable grounds to believe that the cautioner is receiving legal advice, it seems that Scots law requires no further steps to be taken and it does not matter whether the solicitors are also acting for the bank or for the debtor.47 In Forsyth, the bank instructed the husband's solicitors to act on its behalf in the preparation of the security and the solicitors gave the appearance, in communications with the bank, that they were also acting for the wife. The bank had not instructed the solicitors to act for the wife but had reasonably assumed that she was receiving advice from them. On behalf of the wife it was argued that, given the manifest potential for conflict of interest, the duty of good faith meant that the bank could not simply make such an assumption but should have enquired into the position. However, the court held that to advise a person to take advice when it appeared 
